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1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
Norman Y. Mineta, Sharon Sakamoto, Eileen
Yoshiko Sakamoto Okada, and Joy Sakamoto Barker
come forward as amici curiae because they know firsthand about the dangers—particularly for immigrant
and
minority
communities—from
government
exploitation of census data.
The government
weaponized confidential census data during World
War II to facilitate the mass removal and
incarceration of their families and communities. The
unlawful and pretextual manner in which the federal
government has endeavored to add a citizenship
question to the 2020 decennial census compels amici
to offer that profoundly troubling historical context to
inform the Court’s consideration of the questions
presented.
Norman Y. Mineta served as Secretary of
Transportation under President George W. Bush, as
Secretary of Commerce under President Clinton, as a
member of the U.S. House of Representatives from
1975 to 1995, and as mayor of San Jose, California,
from 1971 to 1975. Norm’s parents had to respond as
non-citizens to the 1920, 1930, and 1940 decennial
censuses because this Court made clear in Ozawa v.
United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922), that his parents—
who emigrated from Japan—were not eligible for
naturalized citizenship due to their Japanese
1 This brief is filed with the written consent of all parties.
No counsel for any party authored this brief in whole or in part,
and no person or entity other than amici curiae made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the brief’s preparation or
submission.
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ethnicity. In 1942, when Norm was 10 years old, the
federal government removed him and his family from
their home, and incarcerated them with thousands of
other Japanese Americans—first at the Santa Anita
racetrack in southern California and then at the Heart
Mountain camp in Wyoming. Even though he was a
young boy at the time, Norm clearly recalls being
surprised that the federal government was able to so
quickly round up many Japanese Americans from his
community on the day of the Pearl Harbor bombing
and in the months that followed. Years later, he
learned that the U.S. Census Bureau had provided
critical information that facilitated the surveillance of
Japanese American communities, as well as their
eventual exclusion and incarceration.
Sharon Sakamoto, Eileen Yoshiko Sakamoto
Okada, and Joy Sakamoto Barker are three sisters
who spent World War II incarcerated at the Minidoka
concentration camp in Idaho. Their parents were
American citizens born and raised in Washington
State. Eileen was five years old and Joy was six
months old when the federal government removed
them, their parents, and two brothers from their
Seattle home and sent them all to live in a converted
horse stall at the Puyallup Fairgrounds south of
Seattle. The federal government then moved them to
Minidoka, where Sharon was born. Like Norm and his
family, the Sakamoto family was unaware that the
Census Bureau cooperated with military authorities
by identifying where Japanese Americans lived.
Sharon, Eileen, and Joy join as amici because they are
deeply concerned that the proposed citizenship
question on the 2020 decennial census will cause
immigrants and other persons of color to avoid
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responding for fear that the information will be used
to harm them, just as the federal government harmed
Japanese Americans during World War II.
The Council on American-Islamic Relations
(CAIR) is the Nation’s largest Muslim American civil
rights and advocacy organization, and the Council on
American-Islamic Relations, New York, Inc. (CAIRNY) is an independent New York affiliate. Following
the tragic attacks of 9/11, CAIR and CAIR-NY aided
Muslim New Yorkers impacted by the perceived
misuse of census data. Shortly after 9/11, at the
request of what is now U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, the Census Bureau provided a list of U.S.
cities that had more than 1,000 Arab American
residents. Over a year later, it provided a zip-codelevel breakdown of Arab American populations by
country of origin. Government officials subsequently
insisted that the Bureau disclosed this data to help
notify
travelers
about
currency
reporting
requirements and to improve airport signage. Muslim
Americans, however, viewed these post-9/11
disclosures as pretextual and infected with animus,
thereby reducing their trust and participation in the
2010 decennial census. CAIR and CAIR-NY join as
amici out of concern that the inclusion of a citizenship
question in the 2020 decennial census will further
erode Muslim Americans’ trust and participation.
The Fred T. Korematsu Center for Law and
Equality is a non-profit organization based at the
Seattle University School of Law. It works to advance
justice through research, advocacy, and education.
Inspired by the legacy of Fred Korematsu—who defied
military orders during World War II that resulted in
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the unlawful incarceration of 120,000 Japanese
Americans—the Korematsu Center works to advance
social justice for all. It has a special interest in
addressing government action that harms classes of
persons based on race or nationality.2
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decennial census depends on self-reporting
and can achieve its mandate under the Enumeration
Clause only when the public trusts that the federal
government will not misuse collected information. In
recognition of that fact, every U.S. President since
1910 has issued a proclamation reassuring individuals
and their communities that no harm could result from
participating in the decennial census. Toward that
end, the modern Census Act requires the Secretary of
Commerce to treat census data as confidential.
Despite those assurances, the government has
breached the public’s trust on several occasions
throughout the Nation’s history—particularly during
World Wars I and II. The most notable breach is the
Census Bureau’s 1942 disclosure of data on the
whereabouts of Japanese Americans. The evidence is
clear—and, indeed, the Bureau now admits—that it
provided the data that powered the machinery of mass
removal and incarceration of Japanese Americans
during World War II.
The Census Bureau disclosed confidential data to
wartime authorities out of supposed “military
urgency,” but the coram nobis cases 40 years later
2 The Korematsu Center does not represent the official
views of Seattle University.
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demonstrated any such urgency was a lie. The real
reason for the government’s deplorable treatment of
Japanese Americans was a baseless perception of
disloyalty grounded in racial stereotypes.
As that history demonstrates, the fear that
census data could be used to harm individuals and
communities is anything but abstract. Immigrant
communities and other communities of color, in
particular, thus have good reason to be suspicious of
the government’s decision to include a citizenship
question on the 2020 decennial census. The district
court’s exhaustive post-trial findings confirm that
suspicion here: the citizenship question was added
through a process that the court found to be arbitrary,
and it was based on a justification that the court found
to be pretextual.
The federal judiciary plays a vital role in
ensuring that improper motives do not infect
government decisionmaking. Heeding the lessons of
the government’s historical exploitation of census
data, including its misuse of such data to facilitate the
mass incarceration of Japanese Americans on the
pretext of national security, this Court should firmly
reject the government’s attempt once again to escape
meaningful judicial scrutiny.
ARGUMENT
I.

PUBLIC TRUST IN THE CENSUS DERIVES
FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S
ASSURANCE THAT IT WILL NOT MISUSE
DATA.

The promise of data confidentiality is integral to
the modern Census Bureau’s ability to achieve the
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“actual Enumeration” required by the U.S.
Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see, e.g.,
Vincent P. Barabba & D.L. Kaplan, U.S. Census
Bureau Statistical Techniques To Prevent Disclosure—
The Right of Privacy vs. the Need To Know (1975)
(“Should the public’s confidence in the Bureau’s pledge
of confidentiality for their census returns erode,
goodwill and cooperation will erode.”), quoted in U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, REPORT ON STATISTICAL
DISCLOSURE AND DISCLOSURE-AVOIDANCE TECHNIQUES
32 (1978). In recognition of the need for public trust,
the modern Census Act restricts the Secretary’s ability
to (i) “use the information furnished” by census
respondents “for any purpose other than the statistical
purposes for which it is supplied”; (ii) “make any
publication whereby the data furnished by any
particular establishment or individual *** can be
identified”; or (iii) “permit anyone other than the
sworn officers and employees of the Department or
bureau or agency thereof to examine the individual
reports.” 13 U.S.C. § 9(a)(1)-(3).
The federal government, however, did not always
seek to protect census data. For example, to facilitate
an accurate enumeration in the 1790 decennial
census, the government posted draft census data in
public places to shame noncompliant persons and levy
community pressure on them.
See JASON G.
GAUTHIER, MEASURING AMERICA: THE DECENNIAL
CENSUS FROM 1790 TO 2000, at 129 (2002).
It was not until the early twentieth century that
the Census Bureau (created in 1902) adopted a more
sensible approach of incentivizing participation in the
decennial census through “guarantees *** designed to
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assure the public that they can respond candidly to
government statistical inquiries.” Margo Anderson &
William Seltzer, Challenges to the Confidentiality of
U.S. Federal Statistics, 1910-1965, 23 J. OFFICIAL
STATS. 1, 1 (2007) (hereinafter “Challenges”).
President William Howard Taft sought to remove
politics from the census process by ordering the
Secretary of Commerce and Labor to promulgate
regulations to ensure that “the census shall not be
made to serve the political purposes of any one.” The
Census and Politics, N.Y. TIMES, at 8 (Aug. 18, 1909)
(quoting President Taft’s letter).
In a similar vein, President Taft issued a
proclamation in 1910 to assure the public that
participation in the census would not lead to harm:
The sole purpose of the census is to secure
general statistical information *** , and
replies are required from individuals only in
order to permit the compilation of such
general statistics. The census has nothing
to do with *** army *** service *** , with the
regulation of immigration, or with the
enforcement of any national, state, or local
law or ordinance, nor can any person be
harmed in any way by furnishing the
information required. There need be no fear
that any disclosure will be made regarding
any individual person or his affairs.
1910 Census Proclamation, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU. The
sitting U.S. President has delivered a virtually
identical proclamation for every decennial census
since then. Challenges, supra, at 5.
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Yet the Census Bureau almost immediately
failed to live up to its promise of confidentiality. In
1917, the Bureau disclosed “to courts, draft boards,
and the Justice Department” the names of thousands
of draft-age men who failed to register for the Selective
Service during World War I. Challenges, supra, at 7.
In doing so, the Bureau’s Director concluded that
“statistical confidentiality should be conditioned and
compromised
by
more
apparently
pressing
government needs.” Id.
Unsurprisingly, the floodgates opened: “[O]nce
census officials supported the initial release of
information to draft boards in 1917, officials in other
agencies, for example in the Justice Department,
asked for further releases.” Challenges, supra, at 10.
“[I]n early 1920, while the enumerators were in the
field, the Justice Department, on behalf of the
Department of Labor, asked if the local enumerators
in Toledo, Ohio, could provide information about
individuals’ citizenship from the 1920 Census of
Population *** for use in deportation cases.” Id. at 8
(ellipsis in original) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
After World War I, Census Bureau Directors
William Mott Steuart (1921-1933) and William Lane
Austin (1933-1941) viewed regaining public trust
through data confidentiality as paramount.
See
Challenges, supra, at 9-10, 16. But by 1941, as the
United States faced the prospect of World War II,
President Franklin Roosevelt “sought a mechanism to
permit the administrative and intelligence agencies
access to individual level information collected by the
U.S. Census Bureau.” Id. at 16. President Roosevelt
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“involuntarily retired” Director Austin and nominated
a more compliant director, who immediately
“authorized the Commerce Secretary to provide
officials in other government agencies access to
confidential census data for the ‘national defense
program.’” Id. at 17. Within a year, Congress passed
the Second War Powers Act of 1942, which stated
“[t]hat notwithstanding any other provision of law, ***
data *** in the possession of the Department of
Commerce or any bureau or division thereof, may be
made available *** to any branch or agency of the
Government *** for use in connection with the conduct
of the war.” Pub. L. No. 77-507, § 1402, 56 Stat. 176,
186-187. That Act temporarily suspended the existing
statutory confidentiality protection for census data.
13 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1940).
Requests for the Census Bureau to share census
data continued during the postwar period. For
instance, a few years after the end of World War II,
“the Attorney General’s Office sought information
from census records about certain individuals for use
by the FBI in the context of rising concern about
possible Communist infiltration and sabotage.”
Challenges, supra, at 25 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). To be sure, for a period
beginning in 1962, the “Bureau effectively resisted any
federal agency requests for access to individual reports
for the purpose of taxation, investigation or
regulation.” Id. at 28. But in 2001, the Bureau
facilitated the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security’s post-9/11 access to data from the 2000
decennial census concerning the 5-digit postal codes of
Arab Americans. Id. And “[a]s during the world wars,
there is much discussion today in the United States
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about coordination of government information and
efficiency.” Id. at 30.
The upshot of these examples is that many
Americans—particularly those from immigrant and
minority communities—have reason to distrust how
the government might use responses to a citizenship
question, which could suppress response rates and
degrade the quality of the data gathered. Past
experience has also eroded confidence in the
effectiveness of “ethical safeguards *** to deter the
most likely and persistent ‘intruders,’ that is, other
agencies
of
government
with
investigative,
intelligence, or prosecutorial agendas.” Challenges,
supra, at 29. In today’s age, where national security
and other exigencies have brought the issue of census
data confidentiality back to the fore, it is imperative
that the decennial census be administered in a
manner that eliminates any concern that data will be
wielded against those who provide responses.
II.

THE
MASS
INCARCERATION
OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS, FACILITATED
BY CENSUS DATA AND PRETEXT, SERVES
AS A CAUTIONARY TALE.
A.

The Government Used Census Data To
Incarcerate
Japanese
Americans
During World War II.

One of the most glaring and heinous examples of
the Census Bureau’s violation of the public trust
occurred during World War II: the Bureau played a
central role in the mass removal and incarceration of
over 120,000 Japanese Americans during the spring of
1942. “The historical record is clear that senior
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Census Bureau staff proactively cooperated with the
internment, and that census tabulations were directly
implicated[.]” U.S. CENSUS BUREAU POLICY OFFICE, A
MONOGRAPH OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY IN THE
U.S. CENSUS 16 (July 2001) (hereinafter “CENSUS
BUREAU MONOGRAPH”).
Most directly, the Census Bureau now admits to
“providing 1940 census data on Japanese Americans”
to the War Department, specifically the Western
Defense Command, “for small geographic areas down
to the census tract and block levels.” CENSUS BUREAU
MONOGRAPH, supra, at 15. In February 1942, the
Bureau deployed the head of its statistical research
division, Calvert Dedrick, “to the Western Defense
Command to assist in the implementation of the
evacuations.” Margo Anderson, Public Management of
Big Data: Historical Lessons from the 1940s, FED.
HIST.
17,
22
(2015)
(hereinafter
“Public
Management”).
Dedrick later testified that the
Western Defense Command asked him for “a detailed
cross-tabulation for even the most minute areas,” such
as “cities by blocks.” William Seltzer & Margo
Anderson, After Pearl Harbor: The Proper Role of
Population Data Systems in Time of War 7 (Mar. 28,
2000) (unpublished draft).
Dedrick agreed and
provided unpublished data that allowed the Western
Defense Command “to find where the citizens of
Japanese descent lived” and to identify “exactly the
city blocks where the people of Japanese descent
lived.” Public Management, supra, at 29-30 (citation
and quotation marks omitted).
Contemporaneous evidence confirms the Census
Bureau’s admission. In 1943, U.S. General John L.
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DeWitt, Commander of the Western Defense,
authored what the government offered as the
military’s official account of the wartime removal and
incarceration. J.L. DeWitt, Final Report: Japanese
Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942 (June 5, 1943)
(hereinafter “Final Report”). General DeWitt detailed
how the Bureau performed a “special tabulation” of
1940 decennial census data for the Western Defense
Command, which “plotted on maps” the “total number
of Japanese individuals and families *** for each
census tract.” Id. at 86. Specifically, the Bureau
provided “tables” showing “various city blocks where
the Japanese lived and *** how many were living in
each block.” REPORT OF THE CWRIC, PERSONAL
JUSTICE DENIED 105 n.* (The Civil Liberties Public
Education Fund & University of Washington Press,
1997).
That information allowed the Western Defense
Command to round up Japanese Americans—what
General DeWitt referred to as the “logistics of
evacuation”—with swift and surgical precision. Final
Report, supra, at 356.
Indeed, General DeWitt
concluded that “[t]he most important single source of
information prior to the evacuation was the 1940
Census of Population,” which “became the basis for the
general evacuation and relocation plan.” Id. at 352;
see also id. at 79 (census data was “[o]f prime
importance in shaping the evacuation procedure”).
Beyond sharing data with the Western Defense
Command, the Census Bureau disclosed information
about individual Japanese Americans to federal
agencies. William Seltzer & Margo Anderson, Census
Confidentiality Under the Second War Powers Act
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(1942-1947), at 5 (Mar. 12, 2007) (unpublished draft).
In 1943, pursuant to the Second War Powers Act, the
U.S. Treasury Department requested from the
Commerce Department “a list of the Japanese residing
in the Metropolitan Area of Washington, D.C., as
reported in the 1940 Census, including information as
to addresses.” Id. at 16 & fig. 1. The Commerce
Department complied within seven days, creating a
spreadsheet that listed the “name, address, sex, age,
marital status, citizenship status, status in
employment, and occupation and industry” of 79
Japanese Americans. Id. at 21-22 & figs. 5a-b. The
rapidity of the disclosure demonstrates that “the
Bureau not only provided identifiable micro-data on
Japanese Americans to other federal agencies but also
had well-developed procedures to do so expeditiously.”
Id. at 24.
Thus, at the very least, the 1943
Washington, D.C. disclosure is strong evidence that
“lists of Japanese Americans from the 1940 Census
were provided to assist in the mopping up stages of the
round-up of Japanese Americans on the West Coast.”
Id. at 40.
The foregoing lays bare how the federal
government used the 1940 decennial census for the
purpose of finding and incarcerating Japanese
Americans, despite President Roosevelt’s 1940
proclamation that “[t]here need be no fear that any
disclosure will be made regarding any individual
person or his affairs” and that “[n]o person can be
harmed in any way by furnishing the information
required.” Proclamation 2385: Sixteenth Decennial
Census (Feb. 9, 1940), in 1940 SUPPLEMENT TO THE
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 26-27 (1941). This
shameful episode from our Nation’s history provides
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real-world context for Respondents’ concern that the
Census Bureau will use citizenship data for improper
purposes or in ways that will harm them or their
communities.
B.

The Japanese American Incarceration
Cases Are Powerful Reminders That
This Court Must Be Vigilant In Policing
Pretext.

In addition to asking the Court to remember the
use of census data during World War II, amici ask the
Court to uphold the district court’s searching inquiry
into the government’s stated reason for adding the
citizenship question to the 2020 decennial census and
to ensure that the reason is not pretextual. In the
Japanese American incarceration cases, the Court
failed to scrutinize the government’s claim that its
actions were necessary, and 40 years later, it was
discovered that the government’s reasons were a
pretext for discrimination.
The Court should
remember the lesson of those cases. It should
scrutinize the government’s proffered justification
here (including by subjecting decisionmakers to
discovery), and it should affirm the district court’s
conclusion—based on scores of post-trial factual
findings—that the Secretary of Commerce concealed
his true motivation for adding the citizenship
question.
The district court held that “the sole rationale”
the government “articulated for [its] decision—that a
citizenship question is needed to enhance [the
Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Voting Rights Act
(VRA)] enforcement efforts—was pretextual.” Pet.
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App. 320a. 3 In particular, the district court found
several facts demonstrating that the government
made its decision “well before” the DOJ’s request for a
citizenship question “and for reasons unrelated to the
VRA.” Id. at 313a. Worse still, “the record also
includes evidence of the many ways in which Secretary
Ross and his aides sought to conceal” the decision to
add the citizenship question. Id. at 314a.
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) exists
precisely so that Article III courts can ferret out and
invalidate such agency action. It confers upon courts
the essential responsibility to “set aside agency action”
that is “not in accordance with law” or “in excess of
statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations.” 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (C). And it is a core tenet of APA
review that an agency decisionmaker must “disclose
the basis of” decision. Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962); see also
Securities & Exch. Comm’n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S.
80, 94 (1943) (“[T]he process of review requires that
the grounds upon which the administrative agency
acted be clearly disclosed[.]”).
Pretextual
decisionmaking is anathema to those principles.
The Solicitor General nonetheless invites this
Court to insulate the Secretary’s action from APA
review altogether. Gov’t Br. 21-28. As a fallback, the
3 Significantly, the only other court to consider this
question also found that the Secretary’s rationale was pretextual.
See State v. Ross, No. 18-CV-01865-RS, 2019 WL 1052434, at *48
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2019) (“Together, this evidence establishes that
Defendants intended to use the VRA enforcement as a pretext for
adding the citizenship question when VRA enforcement was not,
in fact, their true purpose.”).
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Solicitor General argues that the district court’s
pretext finding “defies fundamental principles
governing APA review of agency action” because it
puts the focus on an unstated justification not in the
administrative record. Id. at 40-45. Relatedly, the
Solicitor General seeks to shield decisionmakers from
having to reveal their true intentions in discovery. Id.
at 55.
As the Japanese American incarceration cases
poignantly demonstrate, the costs of allowing the
actual justifications for government action to go
undetected—or even unchecked—are unmeasurably
high. There, the government argued that the wartime
orders resulting in the incarceration of 120,000
persons of Japanese ancestry—two-thirds of whom
were American citizens—were justified by military
necessity because those persons posed a threat of
espionage and sabotage. See Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943), conviction vacated 828 F.2d
591 (9th Cir. 1987); Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S.
115 (1943), conviction vacated 772 F.2d 1496, 1498
(9th Cir. 1985); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944), conviction vacated 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1413
(N.D. Cal. 1984). This Court infamously deferred,
reasoning that “it is not for any court to sit in review
of the wisdom of the[] action or [to] substitute its
judgment for [the decisionmakers’].” Hirabayashi, 320
U.S. at 93; see also Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218 (same).
Forty years later, coram nobis petitions revealed
that the government had engaged in “the suppression
of evidence which established *** the real reason for
the exclusion order,” and instead had provided this
Court a false and pretextual record to support the
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mass exclusion of Japanese Americans. Hirabayashi,
828 F.2d at 604. Although the government had
represented that the immediate round-up of Japanese
Americans was necessary because there was
insufficient time to separate the loyal from the
disloyal, General DeWitt’s Final Report originally said
no such thing. Id. at 596, 598. Instead, it took the
racist and revealing position that one could never
separate the “sheep from the goats” because Japanese
Americans were inherently disloyal on account of their
“ties of race, intense feeling of filial piety and ***
strong bonds of common tradition, culture and
customs.” Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F. Supp.
1445, 1449 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
When it was
discovered that the Report contradicted the
government’s argument, the government ordered the
Report revised and destroyed the original versions.
Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 598-599.
The government also failed to apprise this Court
of intelligence reports from the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), and the Office of Naval
Intelligence (ONI) that refuted the government’s claim
of military necessity. Justice Department attorney
John L. Burling attempted to insert a footnote into the
government’s brief in Korematsu, stating that General
DeWitt’s “recital” with respect to “the use of illegal
radio transmitters and shore-to-ship signaling by
persons of Japanese ancestry” were “in conflict with
information in the possession of the Department of
Justice.” Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. at 1417 (emphasis
and internal citation omitted). His memorandum to
Assistant Attorney General Herbert Wechsler stated:
“General DeWitt’s report makes flat statements
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concerning radio transmitters and ship-to-shore
signaling which are categorically denied by the FBI
and by the [FCC]. There is no doubt that these
statements were intentional falsehoods.” Id. at 1424.
The footnote as filed, however, did the opposite of what
Burling recommended in “ask[ing] the Court to take
judicial notice” of “the justification for the evacuation.”
Br. of U.S. 11 n.2, Korematsu v. United States, No. 22
(U.S. Oct. 5, 1944).
Similarly, the ONI’s Kenneth Ringle wrote a
report concluding that there was no basis for mass
incarceration. See Lt. Comm. Kenneth D. Ringle to
Chief of Naval Operations, Report on Japanese
Question (Jan. 26, 1942), in File ASW 014.311, RG
107, U.S. National Archives, Washington, D.C.
Justice Department attorney Edward Ennis urged the
Solicitor General to disclose the report to this Court,
but “[n]otwithstanding [his] plea, the *** brief in
Hirabayashi made no mention of Ringle’s analysis.”
Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d at 602 n.11. The Solicitor
General finally confessed error for this conduct in
2011. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Confession of Error: The
Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese
American Internment Cases (May 20, 2011).
These well-chronicled events make all-tooconcrete the concern that the government’s stated
rationale for pursuing a particular end may be cut
from whole cloth. The APA empowers courts to
evaluate the government’s justification in real time,
rather than discover 40 years later that it was
pretextual.
*

*

*
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Korematsu, Hirabayashi, and Yasui are painful
yet powerful reminders not only of the need for
constant vigilance in protecting our fundamental
values, but also of the essential role of Article III
courts as guardians against pretextual government
action. Rather than repeat the failures of the past,
this Court should repudiate them and affirm the
greater legacy of those cases: Blind deference to the
Executive Branch’s stated rationale is incompatible
with the protection of fundamental freedoms.
Accordingly, this Court should reject the government’s
invitation to abdicate its critical role to root out pretext
under the APA; subject the government’s reason for
adding a citizenship question to the 2020 decennial
census to searching judicial scrutiny; and stand as a
bulwark against government action that threatens
immigrant and other communities of color.

20
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should
affirm the judgment below.
Respectfully submitted.
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